Stuffing the Rabbit Back Into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege In an Administrative Agency Investigation by Editors,
[Vol. 130:1199
COMMENTS
STUFFING THE RABBIT BACK INTO THE HAT: LIMITED
WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY INVESTIGATION
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the common-law
privileges.' It protects information that clients communicate to
their lawyers, 2 but it exists only so long as the clients are willing to
preserve the confidentiality of the underlying communications. 3 If
a client voluntarily 4 breaches the confidentiality and reveals the
contents of the privileged communications to a third party, the
privilege is waived.5 When the client is a corporation, however,
and the privileged documents 7 are disclosed to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in response to an agency request or
subpoena," some courts have found the usual rule of waiver to be
too harsh, and have carved out an exception to the general principle
1Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. WiG-
MoRE, EvEN cE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
2 For a fuller definition of the scope of the attorney-client privilege, see infra
note 31.
3 For any privilege to exist, "[tihe communications must originate in a con-
fidence that they will not be disclosed." 8 J. WIaisorE, supra note 1, § 2285,
at 527 (emphasis in original).
4 Production that is involuntary or compelled may not result in a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
5"A waiver may be effectuated by a disclosure of confidential information.
Once the confidential matter has been disclosed, it is no longer a secret and the
privilege which might be claimed . . . disappears." Magida ex rel. Vulcan De-
tinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd,
231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956). For further discus-
sion of the principle of waiver, see infra text following note 59.
6 "Courts have generally recognized that the attorney-client privilege applies
to corporations ...... United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th
Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see also In re John
Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[The Supreme Court in] Upjohn
affirmed the assumption that a corporation may assert the privilege on its be-
half.") (citation omitted).
7 "Documentary evidence of confidential communications is necessarily privi-
leged as much as testimonial evidence." Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633,
639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
8 The SEC has the power not only to request a corporation's cooperation
with an informal investigation, but also to "subpena witnesses, take evidence, and
require the production of any books, papers, or other documents which the Com-
mission deems relevant or material" to its investigation. 15 U.S.C. §77s(b)
(1976); see also 15 U.S.C. §78u(c) (1976) (judicial enforcement of SEC's in-
vestigative power).
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by allowing a "limited waiver" 9 of the attorney-client privilege.10
Under the doctrine of limited waiver, a corporation may release a
privileged document to the SEC without losing the protection of
the attorney-client privilege as against other parties. The corpora-
tion itself cannot be forced to relinquish the privileged material,
and can prevent the SEC from surrendering the material to anyone
else by requiring the agency to agree to honor the corporation's
privilege before the corporation complies with the agency sub-
poena..1 Under these conditions, neither a private party nor an-
other regulatory ageicy 12 later may demand production of the
document in a separate proceeding without interposition of the
privilege.
Proponents of the doctrine of limited waiver, such as the Eighth
Circuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,'13 contend that
limited waiver serves two goals: promoting the use of outside counsel
to conduct internal corporate investigations,14 and enhancing the
SEC's regulatory function by encouraging production of documents
to the agency.15 Critics of limited waiver, such as the District of
Columbia Circuit in Permian Corp. v. United States,1 argue that
the doctrine is inconsistent with the purposes and principles behind
the attorney-client privilege,'1 and that the public policies of en-
9 The language of "limited waiver" was first introduced in Diversified Indus.
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), and followed in
subsequent cases. See infra text following note 80.
10 See Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611; In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595,
615 n.13, 620-21 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D.
679, 685-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979,
478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73 (E.D. Wis. 1979); cf. In -re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d
793, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (limited waiver permissible if party expressly re-
serves right to assert privilege in subsequent proceedings); Teachers Ins. &
Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 646
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same). But see Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d
1214, 1219-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir.
1979); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); cf. In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) (disclosure
of corporate documents to underwriter for commercial purposes results in general
waiver).
11 This is precisely what the plaintiff corporation attempted to do (albeit un-
successfully) in Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
_12The discussion of limited waiver in this Comment focuses on federal ad-
ministrative agencies and the attorney-client privilege in the federal courts, but
the analysis might apply equally well to state administrative agencies.
13572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). For a more thorough discussion
of Diversified, see infra text following note 80.
14 See, e.g., Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
'5 See, e.g., Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
18 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
17 See id. 1220.
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couraging internal corporate investigations and facilitating the
SEC's function cannot outweigh the judicial policy of admitting all
relevant material into evidence.' 8
This debate has taken on greater significance in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States19
expanding the definition of the corporate client beyond the "control
group" test 20 that had been advocated in most 21 circuits.22  The
"control group" test had limited the application of the attorney-
client privilege in the corporate context to those employees who
were in a position to take action on the legal advice rendered. By
permitting the attorney-client privilege to attach to communications
between attorneys and lower-level corporate employees, the Court
in Upjohn effectively opened the door to increased self-policing of
corporate malfeasance through the use of internal investigations
conducted by outside counsel. 23 Corporations may be more likely
18 See id. 1221-22.
19 449 U.S. 383 (1981). An exhaustive discussion of the Upjohn decision's ef-
fect on the corporate attorney-privilege can be found in Gergaze, Attorney-
Corporate Client Privilege, 37 Bus. LAw. 461 (1982).
20 Upiohn, 449 U.S. at 397. See generally Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court,
400 U.S. 348 (1971); City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.
Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom.
General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 943 (1963).
21
1n re Grand Jury Subpoena, 81 F.R.D. 691, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d
Cir. 1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968).
23At the time the Court decided Upjohn, two competing tests had been
adopted by various circuits: the narrower "control group" test and the broader
"subject matter" test. The subject matter test extends the protection of the
attorney-client relationship to any
communication . . . to the corporation's attorney . ..where a [lower-
level] employee makes the communication at the direction of his supe-
riors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the
attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the com-
munication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his
employment.
Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970). See 28 DRAXE L. REv. 191,
191 (1978-79); 31 VAND. L. REv. 667, 669 (1978).
The Supreme Court, while rejecting the control group test, refused to adopt
explicitly the subject matter test: "We decline to lay down a broad rule or series
of rules to govern all conceivable future questions in this area, even were we able
to do so." 449 U.S. at 386. Nevertheless, it is likely that lower courts will inter-
pret Upjohn as an endorsement of the subject matter test. See Upjohn, 449
U.S. at 402-04 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (urging adoption of subject matter
test); The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HABv. L. P~v. 17, 273 (1981). In
any case, it seems clear that the Court intended the attorney-client privilege to
extend to most communications that would be made in the course of an internal
investigation by corporate counsel. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-92.
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to police themselves, however, if they are confident that the memo-
randa produced by outside counsel will not be used against them
in future litigation.
24
This Comment analyzes the arguments for and against the
theory of limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Although
the discussion focuses on limited waiver in the context of an SEC
investigation, the conclusions drawn may be equally applicable to
other administrative agencies.25 Part I discusses the theoretical
considerations that led to judicial creation of the attorney-client
privilege and their significance when the privilege is applied in the
corporate context. Part II introduces the recent cases in the area
of limited waiver, and outlines the issues that must be resolved.
Part III discusses various formulations of limited waiver and ana-
lyzes the merits of the doctrine. This Comment concludes that
the doctrine of limited waiver should be abandoned by the courts
in favor of the usual rule of waiver.
I. THE ATTORNEY-CLMENT PRIVILEGE
The effect of any privilege is to remove from the judicial
process evidence that might be relevant to the resolution of a dis-
pute. Consequently, privileged communications are generally dis-
favored in the law.26 Virtually no new judge-made privileges have
been developed over the past one hundred years, and commentators
have urged a narrow interpretation of existing privileges.27 Despite
the costs that privileges impose on the evidentiary process, however,
they are generally justified on the grounds that certain relationships
are so valuable to society that they must be fostered by protecting
their confidentiality. 28 One such relationship is that between at-
24A corporation incurs additional risks when it decides to conduct an internal
investigation. "Usually, the expense and possible fruitlessness of discovery dis-
courages potential litigants from bringing suits. But the existence of a detailed
report, prepared with the cooperation of corporate directors and employees, greatly
decreases the cost of discovery. As a result, corporate investigations increase the
likelihood of later litigation." Note, Discovery of Internal Corporate Investiga-
tions, 32 ST.AN. L. REv. 1163, 1178 (1980) (footnote omitted).
25 See infra text accompanying notes 127-45.
26In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit, Michigan, August 1977, 434 F.
Supp. 648, 649 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978).
2 7 See McCoucK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENcE § 77, at 156
(E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
28 See, e.g., G. IaLLY, AN IN-aonucnoN To THE LAw oF EVmENCE § 86, at
317 (1978).
Wigmore's treatise on evidence outlines four requirements for the existence
of a privilege against the disclosure of communications: the communications must
originate in confidence between the parties; the confidentiality must be essential to
the relationship between the parties; the relationship must be one which society
chooses to encourage; and the cost of disclosure must be greater than the in-
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torneys and their clients.29
The attorney-client privilege allows clients 30 to prevent testi-
monial disclosure of confidential legal communications between
themselves and their attorneys.3' Its protection extends to the con-
cremental benefit of achieving the correct judicial result. All four of these con-
ditions must be present for a privilege to attach; the absence of one of the four
requirements often can explain the failure to recognize a particular privilege,
such as that of the doctor-patient relationship. Wigmore suggested that "the fal-
lacy of recognizing [the doctor-patient privilege] ... lies in the incorrect assump-
tion that the second and fourth conditions are generally present." 8 J. WIoMoa,
supra note 1, § 2285, at 527-28.
29 Wigmore felt that all four requirements for the existence of a privilege,
see supra note 28, were met in the attorney-client situation, noting that only the
fourth condition could be "open to any dispute." 8 J. WGMonE, supra note 1,
§ 2285, at 528.
30 The privilege belongs to the client rather than the attorney. 8 J. WiomoRE,
supra note 1, § 2321, at 629. The attorney, however, may assert the privilege
on the client's behalf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 n.8 (1976).
Moreover, as a matter of professional ethics the attorney is "duty bound" to assert
the client's privilege. See Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d
551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967); see generally 2 J. W~xqsTn~r & M. BERcER, WEiNsTEIn's
EViDENCE, 1503(c)[01], at 503-67 (1981).
312 D. Lou=sLrt & C. MtmuzLL, FnsRAL EviDENc § 209, at 518 (1978).
The two most authoritative definitions of the attorney-client privilege are those of
Dean Wigmore and Judge Wyzanski. Wigmore's summary states:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to
that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WiGmorE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554 (footnote omitted). Judge Wyzan-
ski's formulation states:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is
or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communica-
tion was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate
and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was in-
formed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii)
legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d)
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege
has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950).
Another formulation is found in proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503, which defines
the attorney-client privilege as follows:
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to dis-
close and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential com-
munications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client, (1) between himself or his rep-
resentative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or (2) between
his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, or (3) by him or his lawyer
to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest, or (4)
between representatives of the client or between the client and a repre-
sentative of the client, or (5) between lawyers representing the client.
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fidential communication rather than the underlying facts 32: "a party
cannot conceal a fact merely by revealing it to his lawyer." 33 In a
functional sense, then, the attorney-client privilege protects only
the attorney's fact-gathering efforts, assessment of the problem,
and recommendations to the client.84
The attorney-client privilege is deeply rooted in common law 35
as well as Roman law,30 making it the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communicationsa' The modern justification for the
Congress failed to approve proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503, replacing it with
FED. R. Evm. 501. Rule 501 provides, in part, that "the privilege of a witness
. . . shall be governed by the principles of common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."
The effect of Rule 501, then, is to "[incorporate] state rules of privilege to gov-
em state claims and a federal common law for federal claims." Hellerstein,
Current Attorney-Client Privilege Issues, 4 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALS
JOURNAL, Dec. 1979, at 5, 6. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47
(1980). It has been suggested that proposed Rule 503 may nevertheless be con-
sulted as to the limits of the privilege. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM,
573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit, Michi-
gan, August 1977, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 570
F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978).
32 [T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications and
not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that
fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to an-
swer the question, "What did you say or write to the attorney?," but
may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely
because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication
to his attorney.
City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D.
Pa. 1962) (emphasis in original), quoted in Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
395-96 (1981).
33 State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 580, 150 N.W.2d
387, 399 (1967), quoted in Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
34 The privilege does not extend to the mere fact that the client has consulted
or employed an attorney. See generally McCoPMIcK, supra note 27, §§ 89-90, at
182-87.
35 8 J. WiGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 542. But cf. Hazard, An His-
torical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIw. L. REv. 1061,
1070 (1978) ("the historical foundations of the privilege are not as firm as the
tenor of Wigmore's language suggests"). According to Wigmore, the attorney-
client privilege under early English common law protected the lawyer's honor:
a gentleman, it was felt, respected confidences that had been entrusted to him.
8 J. WiGMoRE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 543. Thus, the privilege belonged to the
attorney rather than the client. See id. 544.
36 BRadin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 487, 488 (1928).
37 8 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 542. The courts, however, have
thus far refused to recognize any constitutional right to the attorney-client privi-
lege. See, e.g., Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co.,
12 F.R.D. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (the attorney-client privilege "is without
constitutional guarantee"), aff'd, 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972
(1956). But cf. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("the Sixth Amendment . . . protects the confidentiality of
communications between the accused and his attorney"). The privilege may
nevertheless have some constitutional basis in criminal, but not civil, cases through
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privilege is that clients would be deterred from confiding fully in
their attorneys if they feared that attorneys could be compelled to
disclose what had been said.38 The privilege "rests bn the need for
the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's
reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to
be carried out." 39 Wigmore points out that "[t]here is in civil
cases often no hard and fast line between guilt and innocence," 40
and that disclosures to attorneys should therefore be encouraged to
enable professional advocates to construct the best possible defense.
41
The ultimate purposes of the privilege, therefore, are to pro-
mote lawful conduct and further judicial administration by facili-
tating legal consultation. 42 As a number of commentators have
noted, however, the privilege's benefits are "indirect and specula-
tive," while the costs are "plain and concrete." 43 The privilege,
for example, tends to force litigants to duplicate their investigative
efforts, thus increasing the costs of discovery and litigation.44 More
importantly, the attorney-client privilege, like all privileges, removes
an interrelationship with the fifth and sixth amendments. See State v. Kociolek,
23 N.J. 400, 415, 129 A.2d 417, 425 (1957); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:
Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HAv. L. Bav. 464,
486 n.96 (1977).
38 8 J. WIGmoPE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 545.
39 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). See Hazard, supra
note 35, at 1061:
The attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal element of the
modem American lawyer's professional functions. It is considered in-
dispensable to the lawyer's function as advocate on the theory that the
advocate can adequately prepare a case only if the client is free to disclose
everything, bad as well as good. The privilege is also considered necessary
to the lawyer's function as confidential counselor in law on the similar
theory that the legal counselor can properly advise the client what to do
only if the client is free to make full disclosure.
40 8 1. WiGmoPx, supra note 1, § 2291, at 552 (emphasis deleted).
4' This analysis is equally applicable in criminal cases: a client might conceal
all the facts and thereby miss a valid defense if the privilege were not available.
42 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE RuLE
210 comment (1942), quoted in 8 J. WinMoRE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 549 ("The
social good derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting
for their clients is believed to outweigh the barm that may come from the suppres-
sion of the evidence in specific cases.").
43 8 J. WiGMoBE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554. See also 2 J. WEnsT n &
M. BERcGrn, supra note 30, ff 503[02], at 503-15 ("Th[e] assumption [of confidential-
ity] underlying the privilege is unveriflable"); Popkin, Client-Lawyer Confidentiality,
59 TEx. L. REv. 755, 767 n.91 (1981) ("To my knowledge, there is no empirical
research supporting or rejecting these assumptions. We cannot be completely sure
that confidentiality is important either in encouraging use of lawyers or in helping
the representative protect the client's rights."); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for
Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HtAv. L. Rav. 424, 425 n.7 (1970)
(difficulty of finding empirical proof supporting the proposition that the privilege
encourages more complete communication with counsel).
44 Note, supra note 24, at 1165.
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from the judicial process evidence that might be relevant to the
resolution of a dispute, thus increasing the danger that cases will
be wrongly decided for lack of information.45
Moreover, when the client is a corporation,46 the costs incurred
by upholding the privilege are especially high. "[T]he corporate
lawyer is a repository of information gathered from many sources
within the corporation and available from no other single source." 47
Consequently, the difficulties of duplicating the information dis-
coverable directly from the attorney are "greater as against corpo-
rations than they are when both responsibility and information are
centralized in a single person." 48 A corporate claim of the privilege
may therefore "lead to more of a loss of relevant evidence than
when the privilege is invoked by an individual client." 49
The availability of the privilege in the corporate context may
not even serve the purpose of furthering legal consultation.50 Cor-
porate employees, for example, cannot depend on the attorney-client
privilege to guarantee the confidentiality of their communications
with corporate counsel because the privilege belongs to the corpo-
rate client, who may waive it without the employees' consent.51 As
a result, the availability of the privilege may have little bearing on
a corporate employee's decision to communicate with corporate
counsel.52 Furthermore, the complexity of corporate transactions
and the consequent need for day-to-day advice would seem to pro-
vide sufficient incentives for corporations to consult attorneys re-
45 Wigmore observed that the privilege is "an obstacle to the investigation of
the truth." 8 J. WmMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554.
46 Corporations may claim the benefit of the attorney-client privilege. See
supra note 6. See also cases cited in Developments in the Law--Corporate Crime:
Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HAzv. L. Plv.
1227, 1290 n.84 (1979). See generally 2 D. Lomsr.T. & C. MUELLER, supra
note 31, § 212, at 556; Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to
Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956); Comment, The Privileged Few: The
Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 288
(1972). But cf. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 23, at 273 (little
precedent supports "assumption" that attorney-client privilege applies in cor-
porate context).
47 Note, supra note 43, at 427.
48 2 D. LomusEr. & C. MUErLE, supra note 31, § 212, at 558.
49 2 J. WErNSTmN & M. BERGER, supra note 30, 1503(b)[04], at 503-42
(1981); see Simon, supra note 46, at 955 ("Where corporations are involved . . .
the zone of silence grows larger.").
5 OCf. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 23, at 273-77 (because
privilege applies only when communications would not otherwise occur, privilege
may have no role to play in corporate setting).
SISee Sagor, The Attorney-Client and Work-Product Privileges: Protection
and Assertion, in Busnmss Cmums: A GUmnE FOR CoRPOR, oAN DEFENSE
COUNSEL 188 (J. Gleckel, ed. 1982).
52 Note, supra note 24, at 1172-74; see Note, supra note 43, at 428-29.
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gardless of the availability of the privilege.5 3 Hence, the benefits
derived from extending the attorney-client privilege to corporations
seem particularly slight.54
In general, the party asserting the privilege bears the burden
of establishing all necessary elements of the privilege, including the
confidential nature of the communication. 55  "The sine qua non of
the attorney-client privilege is . . . a confidence reposed-and ef-
fectively imposed-for the purpose of obtaining or furthering legal
assistance." 56 Society "subordinate[s] its interest in the search for
truth" 57 only so long as the confidentiality that fostered the pro-
tected relationship is not breached.5 Thus, the element of con-
fidentiality is not merely a threshold requirement, but must be
maintained for the privilege to retain its vitality.59 A client's
voluntary disclosure or consent to disclosure of confidential infor-
mation to a third party 60 waives the attorney-client privilege.0'
53 See Note, supra note 37, at 473.
54 But cf. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MLTETrx, supra note 31, § 212, at 556:
It is in the public interest that corporations actively seek counsel on [taxa-
tion, environmental protection, and regulatory] matters; it is fair to hope,
though sometimes no doubt the hope is vain, that lawyers will not by
their counsel aid in avoiding the impact of such laws, but will instead
aid in securing reasonable compliance.
M See United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1975); In re
Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated April 19, 1978, 451 F. Supp. 969, 971 (E.D.N.Y.
1978).56 In re Grand jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F.
Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
571n re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
58 See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (footnote omitted): "[S]ecrecy and confidentiality are necessary
to promote the relationship fostered by the privilege. Once the secrecy or con-
fidentiality is destroyed . . . the rationale for granting the privilege in the first in-
stance no longer applies." The client, however, may often be less concerned
with secrecy or confidentiality than with having the attorney-client relationship
used against him. See, e.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th
Cir. 1978) (en banc) (privilege asserted as to materials concerning a "slush fund"
despite public knowledge thereof). Consequently, the client often seeks protection
against discovery from the work-product doctrine as well as the attorney-client
privilege. See, e.g., id.; see also Note, supra note 24. For a brief discussion of
the work-product doctrine, see infra note 61.
59 "One of the most critical attributes of the privilege is that it protects only
communications which the client has made in confidence and has kept confidential."
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp.
638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (emphasis added). See also McCorM~cK, supra
note 27, § 93, at 194 n.14. ("[Dlisclosure . . . deprives a subsequent claim of
privilege based on confidentiality of any significance.").
60 For purposes of the attorney-client privilege, a third party is "one who
stands in a neutral or adverse position vis-a-vis the subject of the communica-
tion." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F.
Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (emphasis added); see McCommcK, supra
note 27, § 91, at 188-89.
61 United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The
attorney-client privilege must be distinguished from the work-product doctrine,
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A waiver of the privilege may be express or implied,62 de-
liberate or unintentional; 63 the onus of preserving secrecy is on the
client.6 4 The waiver rule serves to ensure that the privilege, with
its attendant costs to the' judicial system, is "strictly confined within
the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its prin-
ciple." 61 The ultimate purpose of the privilege is to encourage
clients to discuss secrets with and make declarations against inter-
est to their attorneys, free from the fear that the attorneys will later
be compelled to disclose these confidences. If clients themselves
divulge such information to third parties, chances are that they
would also have divulged it to their attorneys, even without the
protection of the privilege. Thus, once a client has revealed privi-
leged information to a third party, the basic justification for the
privilege no longer applies, and the privilege is waived. 66
which protects from discovery the "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney . . . concerning the litigation." FED. R. Cirv. P.
26(b)(3). The two privileges are not coextensive, although they are obviously
related. The attorney-client privilege protects only "communications" between
attorneys and clients, whereas the work-product doctrine shields notes and
memoranda that have not been communicated. On the other hand, the work-
product doctrine protects only those materials prepared "with an eye toward
litigation." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
Of more particular relevance to the present discussion, the "mere showing of
a voluntary disclosure to a third person . . . should not suffice in itself for waiver
of the work product privilege." AT&T, 642 F.2d at 1299 (emphasis in original).
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine
protects both the attorney-client relationship and a complex of individual
interests particular to attorneys that their clients may not share. And
because it looks to the vitality of the adversary system rather than simply
seeking to preserve confidentiality, the work product privilege is not auto-
matically waived by disclosure to a third party.
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted).
32 E.g., G. IL.t.y, supra note 28, § 91, at 334 ("Waiver may, of course, take
place expressly; it may also result from implication, as where the client volun-
tarily reveals the communication to a judicial or legislative body or to a person
not within the group acting on behalf of the attorney or client") (footnote
omitted).
6 3 See In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Suburban
Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 258 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
8 J. WIGMOrE, supra note 1, § 2327, at 636; Hooker, Lawyers' Responses to Audit
Inquiries and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 Bus. LAw. 1021, 1027 (1980);
Note, Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege upon Voluntary Disclosure
to the SEC, 50 Fopnmnn f L. REv. 963, 968-70 (1982).
4"[Ilf a client wishes to preserve the privilege . . . he must take some af-
firmative action to preserve confidentiality." In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
6 8 J. WiGMoRE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554.
66 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (the attorney-client
privilege "protects only those disclosures-necessary to obtain informed legal
advice-which might not have been made absent the privilege"); In re Penn
Cent. Commercial.Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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Another consideration underlying the waiver rule is that of
fairness. Wigmore observed that "when [a client's] conduct touches
a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires that his privilege shall
cease whether he intended that result or not." 67 Generally, the
fairness argument has been applied in the form of the "subject
matter" waiver rule: once a client has disclosed part of a privileged
communication, the privilege is deemed waived as to all related
communications.6 To allow clients to choose to reveal only certain
parts of a communication-presumably, those parts most favorable
to their cause-would be to convert the privilege from a "shield"
to a "sword" 69 : the privilege could be used "offensively," to paint
a "misleadingly one-sided" picture of the facts.
70
One exception to the waiver rule holds that an involuntary
disclosure does not waive the privilege.71 Thus, a client who has
been compelled erroneously to divulge a privileged communication
in one proceeding may still invoke the privilege in a subsequent
action.72 Similarly, a disclosure made "without opportunity to as-
678 J. WiGmop, supra note 1, § 2327, at 636.
6 8 See Sagor, supra note 51, at 147 (the attorney-client privilege, "once
waived, is not divisible"); Note, supra note 63, at 970 n.48, 971. Courts apparently
retain discretion not to impose the "subject matter" waiver rule where the client
fails to make use of a disclosed communication. See Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at
809 n.54.
69 See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co.,
521 F. Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D.
679, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
70 Teachers, 521 F. Supp. at 641. Accord, Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 818.
71 See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th
Cir. 1978); Shaffer v. Below, 278 F.2d 619, 628 (3d Cir. 1968); Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1163 (D.S.C. 1974); United States
v. New Wrinkle, 1954 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 67,883, at 69,856 (S.D. Ohio 1954);
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 511-12; 3 Jorzrs oN EvIrENcE § 21.22, at 804 n.14 (6th
ed. 1972).
72Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 512 states: "Evidence of a statement or other dis-
closure of privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if
the disclosure was (a) compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity
to claim the privilege." On the effect of proposed but unadopted rules of evidence,
see supra note 31.
The advisory committee note to Rule 512, in discussing erroneously com-
pelled disclosures, rejects the view that the holder of the privilege must "incur
contempt of court and exhaust all legal recourse" in order to sustain the privilege.
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 512 advisory committee note. The committee note does,
however, appear to contemplate that the compulsion must be judicial in order
for the disclosure to be deemed voluntary; mere intimidation would not seem to
be enough. Id. ("The modest departure from usual principles of res judicata is
justified by the advantage of having one simple rule, assuring at least one oppor-
tunity for judicial supervision in every case."). See also McComuncK, supra note
27, § 93, at 195 (arguing that when clients are asked on cross-examination about
communications with their lawyers, and they respond without asserting the privi-
lege, such testimony is a voluntary disclosure waiving the privilege). Cf. 8
J. WMoRE, supra note 1, § 2270, at 417 (where witness has properly claimed
privilege against self-incrimination and claim has been erroneously overruled,
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sert the privilege" 71 is generally considered not to trigger the
waiver rule. Once a client makes a considered choice to divulge a
privileged communication, however, the privilege is waived and
cannot be regained.74
In sum, the fundamental justification for the attorney-client
privilege is to encourage clients to divulge confidences to their
attorneys. The theory is that attorneys can defend their clients
properly in court only if they are apprised of all relevant informa-
tion, incriminating as well as exculpatory. The rationale for the
privilege further assumes that clients will confide in their attorneys
only if they know that the attorneys cannot be compelled to breach
the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship. If the client
voluntarily breaches that confidentiality, the privilege is waived
automatically.
II. THE CASE LAW ON LIMITED WAIVER
The principle of limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege
is a relatively recent innovation. The issue has arisen most often
in situations where corporations have, either of their own volition75
or at the suggestion of the SEC,76 retained outside counsel to in-
vestigate suspected instances of corporate misconduct. The corpo-
rations have then voluntarily surrendered the reports resulting from
these investigations to the SEC as part of the Commission's "volun-
tary disclosure" program.7 7  This program saved the SEC staff the
evidence of testimony is inadmissible against witness in any subsequent proceed-
ing). See infra text accompanying notes 134-45.
78Proposed Fed. B. Evid. 512(b). Examples of such inadvertent disclosure
are "disclosure by an eavesdropper, by a person used in the transmission of a
privileged communication, by a family member participating in psychotherapy, or
privileged data improperly made available from a computer bank." Id. advisory
committee note. See, e.g., Dunn Chem. Corp. v. Sybron Corp., 1975-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 760,561, at 67,463 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see Underwater Storage,
Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970).
74 The traditional standard of waiver, particularly waiver of a constitutional
right, is "the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege." Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). This standard does not apply in the con-
fdential privilege situation, where "knowledge or lack of knowledge of the ex-
istence of the privilege appears to be irrelevant." Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 511
advisory committee note. See also 8 J. WIOmoBm, supra note 1, § 2327, at 636.
Cf. supra note 37.
75 See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 600-01 (8th
Cir. 1977).
76 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
77 For a fuller discussion of the voluntary disclosure program, see id. 800-01,
818-20; Block & Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintaining the Con-
Jidentiality of a Corporate Client's Communications with Investigative Counsel, 35
Bus. Aw. 5, 6, 17-19 (1979).
1209
1210 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
time and energy they would otherwise have spent conducting their
own investigations. The participating corporations benefited be-
cause the SEC offered them leniency and a chance to avoid an
embarrassing formal investigation. 78 When the corporations have
later become embroiled in litigation, however, they have attempted
to shield the investigative reports and underlying documentation
from discovery, arguing that their disclosure to the SEC should not
be deemed to have breached the confidentiality essential to the
continuation of the attorney-client privilege.
A. Diversified and Its Progeny
Although the theory of limited waiver was first raised in court
in 1973,79 it did not find judicial acceptance until the Eighth Circuit
considered Diversified Industries v. Meredith,0 in 1977. Diver-
sified arose after a proxy fight at the company revealed that Diversi-
fied might have maintained a "slush fund" for bribing purchasing
agents of other companies. The Diversified board of directors hired
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, a Washington, D.C. law firm, to in-
vestigate these charges."' The law firm interviewed many Diversi-
fied employees and eventually produced a memorandum for the
board. 2 Diversified surrendered a copy of this memorandum to
the SEC in response to an agency subpoena, and subsequently
entered into a consent decree with the Commission. At the same
time, the Weatherhead Company filed suit against Diversified for
allegedly bribing Weatherhead's purchasing agents with the slush
78 Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 819.
79 See In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). Penn Central involved a private SEC investigation of the Penn Central
Transportation Company, during which the Commission subpoenaed documents
from a member of a law firm that had represented certain investment banking
concerns in connection with Penn Central debenture offerings. The law firm
produced the requested documents and two of its attorneys testified before the
Commission. In a subsequent private suit against one of the law firm's clients,
plaintiffs attempted to gain access to the information that had been disclosed to
the SEC. The defendants argued that the information was protected by the
attorney-client privilege, claiming that "disclosure in a nonpublic investigation
does not waive the attorney-client privilege in later civil litigation." Id. 462.
The court held that the privilege had been waived. The defendant's waiver argu-
ment, the court said, "would permit selective waiver of the privilege," an un-
tenable result. Id. 463. "Once the secrecy or confidentiality is destroyed by a
voluntary disclosure to a third party, the rationale for granting the privilege in
the first instance no longer applies." Id. (footnote omitted).
80 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane),
81 Id. 600.
82 Id. 600-01.
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fund, and sought production of the law firm's memorandum in
discovery.ss
The original panel found that the disputed memorandum was
not covered by the attorney-client privilege because the law firm
had not been hired to provide legal advice.8 4  On rehearing en
banc, however, the court (led by the dissenter from the original
panel) disagreed, and found that the law firm had provided legal
advice.85 The court also held that the interviewed employees fit
within the framework of the attorney-client relationship, and in so
doing rejected the "control group" test. 6 Thus the en banc panel
reached the issue of limited waiver, an issue that the original panel
had touched only in dicta. 7
With little discussion and scant precedential support,s8 the
court accepted Diversified's argument that disclosure of the memo-
83 Id. 599.
84 Id. 603. The court discussed the problem of the corporate client and re-
viewed both the "control group" test and the alternative Harper & Row "subject
matter" formulation, see supra note 23, but found it unnecessary to resolve this
issue. 572 F.2d at 602-03. In addition, the original panel held that the memo-
randum was not subject to the work-product privilege under Fun. R. Civ. P. 26
(b) (3) because no suit had been fied, and thus the material had not been assem-
bled "in anticipation of litigation." 572 F.2d at 604. See supra note 61.
85 Id. 610.
86 Id. 608-09. The Diversified court's rejection of the "control group" test and
its acceptance of the Harper & Row standard (sometimes called the "subject
matter" test), thus presaged the Supreme Courtes decision in Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), by two years. See supra notes 19-23 and
accompanying text.
8T The original panel had indicated that it
would be reluctant to hold that voluntary surrender of privileged material
to a governmental agency in obedience to an agency subpoena constitutes
a waiver of the privilege for all purposes, including its use in subsequent
private litigation in which the material is sought to be used against the
party which yielded it to the agency.
572 F.2d at 604 n.1.
88 The court teached its conclusion with only two supporting citations, see id.
611, both marginally related to the issue at hand. In Bucks County Bank &
Trust Co. v. Storck, 397 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Hawaii 1969), the issue was whether
waiver of the privilege at a suppression hearing operated as a general waiver,
while United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961), did not involve the attorney-client privilege at
all, but rather the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In re
Penn Cent. Commercial Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), was thus the
first case to address the issue of limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege
head-on, and the first to involve waiver in the context of an SEC investigation.
See supra note 79. The en bane opinion in Diversified failed to mention Penn
Central, which had rejected the limited waiver theory. Judge Heaney, who wrote
the en bane opinion, did not make the same mistake in his dissent from the
original panel's opinion, which cited Penn Central as precedent against the prin-
ciple of limited waiver. 572 F.2d at 604 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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randum to the SEC did not constitute a general waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. The court declared that
[a]s Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate
and nonpublic SEC investigation, we conclude that only a
limited waiver of the privilege occurred. . . . To hold
otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing
procedure of corporations to employ independent outside
counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect
stockholders, potential stockholders and customers.8 9
The majority's unspoken assumption was that corporations would
be unwilling to invoke the attorney-client privilege to protect their
internal investigations from the scrutiny of the SEC. The author
of the original opinion dissented from the en banc result but agreed
that "the privileges claimed by Diversified, if originally extant, were
not waived by the voluntary disclosures made by Diversified to the
Securities & Exchange Commission." 90
The Diversified opinion sparked much commentary in the legal
field, but mostly for its treatment of the problem of the corporate
client. 91 Two subsequent district court cases,92 however, not only
applied but also appeared to expand Diversified's limited waiver
doctrine. Although the Diversified court's sole justification for em-
bracing limited waiver was to encourage corporations to undertake
internal investigations,93 the district court opinions framed the
rationale for the limited waiver theory in terms of encouraging
voluntary cooperation with government agencies 94-a considerably
89572 F.2d at 611 (citations omitted).
90 572 F.2d at 612.
91 See, e.g., Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege-A Compromise
Solution: Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 11 CoNN. L. REv. 94 (1978); Note,
The Attorney-Client Privilege: A Look At Its Effect on the Corporate Client and
the Corporate Executive, 55 IND. L.J. 407 (1980); Note, Attorney-Client Privi-
lege-Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith: New Rules For Applying the
Privilege When the Client Is a Corporation, 57 N.C.L. REv. 306 (1979); 28
DRAKE L. REv. 191 (1978-79); 33 VAND. L. REv. 999 (1980); 31 VAND. L. REv.
667 (1978).
921n re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368 (E.D.
Wis. 1979); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Cf.
In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding disclosure to SEC
effected complete rather than limited waiver and requiring attorney to testify be-
fore grand jury: distinguishing Diversified as case involving private litigation and
therefore not requiring "judicial intervention in the grand jury process").
93 See supra text accompanying note 89.
94478 F. Supp. at 372-73; 85 F.R.D. at 688. Grand jury Subpoena involved
an internal investigation, 478 F. Supp. at 370-71, but Byrnes did not, 85 F.R.D.
at 681-82. The Byrnes court rejected the argument that the Diversified limited
waiver theory applied only to "corporate housecleanings." Id. 688. See also
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 823-24 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Interestingly, the
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broader public policy goal than merely encouraging corporations
to police themselves.
In Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v.
Shamrock Broadcasting Co.,95 another case dealing directly with the
issue of limited waiver in an SEC investigation, the court initially
seemed to read the Diversified opinion as confining limited waiver
to situations involving internal corporate investigations. The court
noted that "the reliance of the Diversified court on the need to
encourage hiring of outside counsel to investigate suspected instances
of corporate conduct [sic] is inapposite here," 96 because the com-
pany had not conducted its own investigation. Nevertheless, the
Teachers court's ultimate conclusion did not hinge on the presence
or absence of an internal investigation: the court held that the
attorney-client privilege had been waived because the plaintiff had
not asserted the privilege in response to the SEC subpoena. "[D]is-
closure to the SEC should be deemed to be a complete waiver of
the attorney-client privilege unless the right to assert the privilege
in subsequent proceedings is specifically reserved at the time dis-
closure is made." 97 Although the Teachers opinion labelled this
formulation "a third alternative" to general waiver and limited
waiver,98 the outcome is essentially the same as that in Diversified,
for under this ruling no party willingly would surrender privileged
documents to the SEC without first obtaining "a protective order,
stipulation, or other express reservation of the producing party's
claim of privilege as to the material disclosed." 09 The Teachers
approach rests the outcome on whether a party intended to waive
the privilege. A party's intention to waive or not to waive the
privilege, however, is generally not considered determinative of
whether a waiver actually has taken place: "A privileged person
original Diversifed opinion (as opposed to the en bane opinion) also identified
furthering voluntary cooperation with government agencies as the goal of limited
waiver. See supra note 87.
95521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
96 Id. 645.
97 Id. See also Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 824 ("In the final analysis, Diver-
sified goes much farther than necessary to accomplish its objective. The SEC
or any other government agency could expressly agree to any limits on disclosure
to other agencies consistent with their responsibilities under law. But courts
should not imply such agreements on a categorical basis.") (footnote omitted).
98 521 F. Supp. at 646.
991d. See also Note, supra note 63, at 985-87 (reaching an identical conclu-
sion). In almost any circumstance the SEC would have no reason to refuse such
a stipulation; the agency receives the documents it has demanded, and which
otherwise would be unavailable, with only minor inconvenience.
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would seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon
could alone control the situation." 100
B. Permian
The Diversified limited waiver theory stood essentially un-
challenged until the District of Columbia Circuit decided the case
of Permian Corp. v. United States.1' 1 The Permian case developed
from Occidental Petroleum's unsuccessful attempt to take over the
Mead Corporation. Mead had opposed Occidental's proposed ex-
change offer, and initiated litigation to prevent the takeover. Dur-
ing the course of discovery, Occidental produced over two million
documents in response to Mead's requests. 0 2
At the same time, the SEC found itself buried under a similar
avalanche of Occidental documents during its consideration of
Occidental's registration statement for the proposed exchange offer.
"The SEC made it clear that processing of the registration state-
ment would be greatly facilitated by access to Occidental documents
presifted by Mead; without that access, considerable delay could
result." 103 Occidental acceded to this request, subject to certain
procedural safeguards designed to protect Occidental's privileges. 104
Occidental ultimately abandonedf its exchange offer, but not before
Mead had submitted one thousand Occidental documents to the
SEC. Thirty-six of the documents dealt with the legality of oil-
pricing policy at Permian, an Occidental subsidiary; the instant
litigation began when Occidental objected to a request by the
100 8 J. WiGmoRE, supra note 1, § 2327, at 636.
101 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
102To prevent inadvertent waiver of the privilege, Occidental and Mead
stipulated that "inadvertent production of a privileged document would not con-
stitute a waiver of the privilege." Id. 1216.
103 Id.
104 According to counsel for Occidental, Mead had been permitted to release
Occidental documents received in discovery to the SEC, but had been required
to inform Occidental which documents had been delivered within forty-eight
hours. Each document was to have been stamped with the following legend:
This Document constitutes a Trade Secret and/or Commercial or Finan-
cial Information which is Privileged and Confidential and May not be
Released or Disclosed.
Pursuant to procedures adopted by Occidental & the Securities & Ex-
change Commission, this Document may not be disclosed by the Com-
mission to any third-party unless prior notice of such proposed disclosure
has been given to Occidental.
Id. The Permian court found that Occidental's interpretation of its agreement
with the SEC was correct, id. 1219, but held that the agreement could not
prevent a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that this agreement between Occidental and the SEC would have satisfied
the requirement of the Teachers court that the privilege be "specifically reserved."
521 F. Supp. at 645. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
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Department of Energy for those thirty-six documents. 1 5 The
Permian court ruled that the attorney-client privilege had been
waived as to the documents, but that the work product doctrine 0 6
covered twenty-nine of the thirty-six documents. 07 Thus, the
Department of Energy was allowed access to only seven of the docu-
ments it had sought.
Addressing Occidental's attorney-client privilege claim, the
Permian court declared that "Occidental asks this court to create
an exception to the traditional standard for waiver by adopting the
'limited waiver' theory of Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith
. . . [but] we find the 'limited waiver' theory wholly unpersua-
sive." 108 The court noted that the theory of limited waiver does
not serve the principles underlying the attorney-client privilege,109
and rejected "the argument that some public policy imperative in-
herent in the SEC's regulatory program requires that the traditional
waiver doctrine be overridden." 110 The attorney-client privilege,
said the court, "should be available only at the traditional price: a
litigant who wishes to assert confidentiality must maintain genuine
confidentiality." 111 Thus the court pointedly disagreed with the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Diversified in reaching its result.
112
105 665 F.2d at 1217. The court noted that Mead turned these documents over
to the SEC three days before informing Occidental, id., but did not find this fact
significant because "Occidental did not request that they be returned unread." Id.
1210.
10 See supra note 61.
107 665 F.2d at 1222.
108 Id. 1220.
109 Id. ("The Eighth Circuit's limited waiver rule has little to do with the
confidential link between the client and his legal advisor.")
110 Id. 1221.
111 Id. 1222.
112 The Second Circuit recently reached a similar conclusion in In re John
Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982), a case involving a corporation's internal
investigation-at the request of the SEC, id. 484 n.2--of an alleged attempt by
the corporation to bribe a public official. The report resulting from the investiga-
tion was disclosed, not to the SEC, but to an accounting firm conducting an audit
and to a lawyer representing an underwriter in connection with a public offering
of the corporation's securities. Id. 485. In addition, a member of the accounting
firm discussed the alleged bribe with the corporation's general counsel. The
court held that this latter conversation and the disclosure of the report to counsel
for the underwriter waived the attorney-client privilege because they had taken
place "for reasons other than seeking legal advice." Id. 488. The court en-
dorsed Permian's rejection of "a 'pick-and-choose' theory of attorney-client privi-
lege," finding the case before it "somewhat stronger since it does not involve an
agreement with a governmental agency purporting to protect the privilege so far
as other agencies are concerned." Id. 489 (quoting Permian Corp. v. United.
States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). See also In re Weiss, 596
F.2d 1185 (4th Cir. 1979) (testimony by an attorney before SEC waived privilege
in later grand jury proceeding); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61
F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), discussed supra note 79.
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III. ANALYSIS OF LIMITED WAIVER
The doctrine of limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege
represents a clear departure from the privilege's general require-
ment of confidentiality.113 In order to determine whether such an
exception should be made, the potential benefits of accepting the
doctrine must be weighed against the costs." 4 The costs to the
judicial system are obvious: limited waiver deprives the courts of
relevant information that would otherwise be available if the privi-
lege were deemed waived. Limited waiver would thus protect
privileged information as to which confidentiality is not important
to the client, making the privilege broader than necessary.15
The benefits of limited waiver to the client are equally obvious:
an individual or corporation could choose to disclose privileged
information when disclosure appears advantageous, while retaining
the privilege to deny other parties access to the information. At-
torneys, too, might benefit from limited waiver through increased
legal consultation. Benefits to attorneys and clients, however, do
not provide support for either the privilege itself or for limited
waiver. The attorney-client privilege would exist even if attorneys
and clients were indifferent to it, because it provides other benefits
to society in the form of potential improvements in the admin-
istration of justice.116 Similarly, the limited waiver theory must be
justified by advantages accruing to society as a whole. Courts that
have addressed the question have identified two such potential
advantages: increased internal corporate investigations and facilita-
tion of administrative agencies' functions.
1 7
Until now the theory of limited waiver has been discussed as a
static concept, but the theory can assume many possible formula-
tions. The balancing considerations for and against limited waiver
may weigh differently for each possible theoretical formulation;
the next problem is to determine to what extent, if at all, a theory
of limited waiver should apply.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
114 "[Tihe instrumental underpinnings of the modem attorney-client privilege
seem to require that courts adhere to a consistent practice of weighing the bene-
fits to be gained by applying the privilege against the costs of excluding evi-
dence ... . Note, supra note 37, at 468.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
116 See supra text accompanying notes 38-42. See also Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (purpose of attorney-client privilege "is to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administra-
tion of justice").
11"7 See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
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A. The Limits of Limited Waiver
For the purposes of this Comment, four types of limited waiver
will be considered: a general limited waiver, a selective admin-
istrative limited waiver, an overall administrative limited waiver,
and a limited waiver only for the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
1. General Limited Waiver
A general theory of limited waiver is really not a theory of
waiver at all. Under this formulation, the usual rules regarding
waiver of, a privilege 118 would be discarded, and breach of the
confidentiality underlying the attorney-client privilege in one set-
ting or to one party would never effect a waiver of the privilege as
to any other party or in any other proceeding. In other words, a
party could divulge privileged information selectively to anyone
without ever waiving the attorney-client privilege.
2. Selective Administrative Limited Waiver
A selective administrative limited waiver would allow a party
to reveal privileged confidential material to any federal administra-
tive agency without waiving the attorney-client privilege as to any
private party or as to any other administrative agency. This formu-
lation would be narrower than the general theory of limited waiver,
because production of the confidential information to a private
party would still result in the usual waiver of the privilege. Selec-
tive administrative limited waiver would not recognize any char-
acteristics of the SEC situation as unique, treating all federal
administrative agencies in a similar fashion.
3. Overall Administrative Limited Waiver
Under a theory of overall administrative limited waiver, pro-
duction of privileged information to an administrative agency would
operate as a waiver of the privilege as to all federal administrative
agencies, but would not serve as a waiver of the privilege as to
other parties. As with selective administrative limited waiver, this
alternative would not distinguish between administrative agencies.
An overall administrative limited waiver would also be the only
theory that would harmonize the contrary results in Permian Corp.
I's See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
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v. United States 119 and Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.120
Production to a private party would again operate as a general
waiver.
4. Limited Waiver Only For the SEC
Under limited waiver only for the SEC, production to the
SEC would not effect a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to
any other party, but production to other parties, including other
administrative agencies, would effect a general waiver. Limited
waiver for the SEC would be premised on the notion that there are
certain characteristics unique to an SEC investigation,121 and would
encourage production of privileged documents to that agency above
all others.
5. Analysis of the Alternatives
The first theory presented, general limited waiver, cannot be
accepted because it is clearly too broad. The rationales offered to
support a theory of limited waiver do not apply to the general
limited waiver formulation. The primary justification for limited
waiver lies in the public policy of encouraging cooperation with an
administrative agency and compliance with its subpoena.12 This
public policy goal is not served when privileged material is sur-
rendered to a private party, but the cost to the evidentiary process
under general limited waiver remains the same. General limited
waiver thus must be rejected.
The doctrine of overall administrative limited waiver would
cure the objection that "a doctrine of limited waiver would enable
litigants to pick and choose among regulatory agencies in disclosing
and withholding communications of tarnished confidentiality for
their own purposes." 123 Overall administrative limited waiver,
however, would give governmental agencies a decided advantage
over private parties in the evidentiary process. There is nothing
in the background of the attorney-client privilege that would justify
such a result. Within the limits of legislative authorization, the
119 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
120572 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). Both Permian and Diversified
involved release of privileged documents to the SEC, but in Permian the third
party that later sought the documents was another regulatory agency (the FTC),
while in Diversified the third party was a private litigant. The Diversified court
accepted the limited waiver theory; the Permian court rejected it.
121 Another possibility that will not be discussed would be overall adminis-
trative limited waiver only for the SEC.
1 2 See supra text following note 92.
123 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221-22.
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judicial system should not discriminate between private parties and
government agencies; justice demands that all litigants be treated by
the same rules. In addition, overall administrative limited waiver
would be a much broader exception to the confidentiality require-
ment 12 4 than selective administrative limited waiver, in that not
just one but all government agencies would have access to privileged
material. Overall administrative limited waiver would also create
a problem for the courts when public interest groups, such as the
American Civil Liberties Union or the NAACP, are involved, for
public interest groups could legitimately claim that public policy
supports their functions as much as those of regulatory agencies.
Furthermore, the theory of overall administrative limited
waiver would not necessarily further the goal of promoting volun-
tary cooperation with government agencies, as the Permian scenario
suggests. 12 If a federal administrative agency presses a corporation
for production of a privileged document that the corporation does
not want another agency to see, the corporation may choose not to
surrender the documents at all rather than to allow every agency
to have access to the privileged information. Overall administra-
tive limited waiver thus does not achieve the maximum public
policy benefit available under limited waiver and imposes a greater
cost on the integrity of the evidentiary process; therefore, it should
be rejected as inferior to selective administrative limited waiver.
The difference between the two remaining theories, selective
administrative limited waiver and limited waiver only for the SEC,
is in the range of situations in which limited waiver can be invoked.
The question, then, is whether there are any considerations unique
to an SEC investigation, or whether all federal administrative
agencies (including the SEC) should be treated alike.
The public policy objective identified by the Diversified court
-that of encouraging corporations to undertake their own internal
investigations 26-might be better served by limited waiver only for
the SEC if the SEC were more likely than other government
agencies to request access to the fruits of those investigations.
While this has been true of the SEC in the past, nothing prevents
other administrative agencies from instituting their own "voluntary,
disclosure" programs.12 7 Moreover, the public policy of encourag-
124 See supra text accompanying notes 55-66.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 101-11.
126 See supra text accompanying note 89.
12 7 See supra text accompanying notes 75-78. It should be noted, however,
that the SEC, unlike other agencies, is primarily interested in full disclosure.
See infra note 130.
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ing cooperation with agency investigations appears to be no stronger
for the SEC than for any other administrative agency; there is "no
congressional directive or judicially-recognized priority system that
places a higher value on cooperation with the SEC than on coopera-
tion with other regulatory agencies." 128 In the specific instance of
the Permian case, for example, the public benefit derived from
Occidental's production of the disputed documents to the SEC
would be limited to present and prospective stockholders of the
two corporations,129 while production of the same documents (deal-
ing with the legality of Permian's oil-pricing strategy) to the Federal
Trade Commission could benefit a broad range of consumers. From
a public policy perspective, then, there seems to be no reason to
distinguish between the SEC and other regulatory agencies for the
purposes of limited waiver.
In one sense, however, production to the SEC may be easier to
encourage than production to other federal agencies, because the
SEC is not generally a prosecutorial agency.130 Its mission is to
supervise full disclosure, not to pass judgment on the legality of
various questionable corporate practices. A corporation, then, may
be more willing to cooperate with the SEC than with other regula-
tory agencies, because the SEC would only wish to compare for
accuracy the privileged information to information in the corpora-
tion's registration statement. This fact alone, however, would not
seem to justify the creation of a special evidentiary privilege for a
corporation that faces an SEC subpoena. It is of interest only to
the corporation, and not to the judicial system, that cooperation
with an SEC subpoena or request may entail less unpleasant con-
sequences than cooperation with the subpoena of any other federal
administrative agency.
On the other hand, the consequences of resisting an SEC sub-
poena or request may be more unpleasant than the consequences
of resisting other agencies' demands. The SEC has the power to
block or impede a corporation's access to capital markets by delay-
128 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
129 Stockholders of a corporation would always seem to benefit when that
corporation's registration statement becomes effective.
1307he Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a-77jj (1976), and the Securities Act of 1933, codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §77a-77bbbb (1976), authorize the SEC to supervise the filing of regis-
tration statements that disclose all material facts about a corporation's financial
position. See E. TnomA.s & R. SmELs, FEDERAL SEcUMrns AcT HAZMBoox 13
(4th ed. 1977) (the Securities Act "does not empower the SEC to pass upon the
merits of securities. It is a 'disclosure' statute."). After an investigation, how-
ever, the SEC may refer a case to other governmental authorities for civil prosecu-
tion or to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. Id. 229.
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ing approval of its registration statement.131 In Permian, for ex-
ample, the SEC suggested that allowing the Commission access to
privileged documents would expedite review of Occidental's regis-
tration statement for Mead stock.132 The district court in that case
concluded that the SEC's "repeated request" made the decision to
supply the documents "less than voluntary." 133
This observation raises the possibility that disclosure to the
SEC should be deemed to fall into the "voluntariness" exception
to the waiver rule, which holds that an involuntary breach of con-
fidentiality does not waive the attorney-client privilege.13 4 In In
re John Doe Corp.,135 a similar claim was rejected by the Second
Circuit. The corporation argued that its disclosure of an internal
report to counsel for an underwriter "was not voluntary because it
was coerced by the legal duty of due diligence and the millions of
dollars riding on the public offering of registered securities." 136
The court viewed this argument "with no sympathy whatsoever,"
holding that "[o]nce a corporate decision is made to disclose [priv-
ileged communications] for commercial purposes, no matter what
the economic imperatives, the privilege is lost . . " 137 The John
Doe approach is clearly consistent with the traditional standard for
131The SEC can delay a corporation's registration statement by successive
requests for amendment. Each required amendment delays the effective date of
the registration statement until twenty days after the amendment is complete.
Thus, the Commission could theoretically delay a registration statement indefinitely
by continued requests for amendment. In addition, the Commission might refuse
to accelerate the effective date of the issuer's price amendment, and no underwriter
would participate in an offering in which the price was set twenty days before the
security could be sold.
-32 See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
133 Permian Corp. v. United States, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 197,523 (D.D.C. May 15, 1980) (summary), rev'd in part, 665 F.2d
1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The circuit court reversed on this point, however, de-
claring that "[i]f Occidental's massive and amorphous response to the SECs in-
formation requests necessitated lengthy review ... then Occidental's acquiescence
can only be attributed to its own preference for swifter approval of the registra-
tion statement at the risk of disclosure of confidential communications." Id. 1221
n.14.
134 See supra text accompanying notes 71-74. See also Comment, Corporate
Self-Investigations Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 U. Cm. L. REV.
803, 807 n.16, 810-11 (arguing that disclosure to SEC is compelled by regulatory
obligations and is therefore not "voluntary"); cf. United States v. New Wrinkle,
Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. (CCH) 167,883 (S.D. Ohio 1954) (presence of govern-
ment agents in place of business involves "implied coercion" and makes sur-
render of documents involuntary).
135 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Upjohn Co.,
600 F.2d 1223, 1227 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 449 U.S.
383 (1981).
136 675 F.2d at 489.
'37 Id.
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involuntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege, which requires
either judicial compulsion 38 or the involvement of a third party
such as an eavesdropper. 39 Like the decision to disclose a report
to an underwriter, the decision to turn over privileged communica-
tions to the SEC is a considered choice made in order to avoid
unpleasant economic consequences. 140 The argument that such a
waiver of the privilege is involuntary therefore should be rejected.
Another variation on the involuntariness argument focuses on
the broad discretionary powers of the SEC. The SEC has the
potential to penalize an uncooperative corporation in a number of
ways, such as by damaging its business reputation and relationships,
or by suspending trading in its stock for ten days.' 4 ' A waiver in-
duced by fear of improper official action might indeed be considered
involuntary, and therefore not a waiver at all.142 There is, however,
no proof that the SEC abuses its discretion in retaliation for a
corporation's invocation of the attorney-client privilege. 4 3  More-
over, the SEC is not the only agency with broad discretion.
144 If
disclosure to the SEC is deemed involuntary, the same reasoning
would have to apply to disclosures to other agencies as well. Even
if proof of widespread abuse of governmental discretion existed,
justifying a general theory of limited waiver on these grounds would
amount to a tacit acceptance of improper official action. Thus,
138 But cf. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir.
1978) (disclosure of privileged documents under "extraordinary" accelerated dis-
covery proceedings not voluntary).
'
3 9 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
140 This balancing of the possible results by the corporation seems very simi-
lar to the well-entrenched system of plea bargaining. While some commentators
might argue that plea bargaining does not produce "voluntary" pleas, it is gen-
erally accepted that negotiated pleas are in fact voluntary. See, e.g., North Caro-
lina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33 (1970) (decision to accept a plea bargain was
based on defendant's preference that "the dispute between him and the state . . .
be settled by a judge in the context of a guilty plea proceeding rather than by
a formal trial"); United States v. Howell, 661 F.2d 96, 97 (8th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Law, 633 F.2d 1156, 1157 (5th Cir. 1981).
141Rowe, Representing a Public Corporation Involved in an SEC Investiga-
tion, in PcnAcnrCma LAw INSTrTuTE, HiawuNnc AN SEC INVESTIGAI"ON 1980 19-
20 (1980).
142 Cf. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis,
55 Txx. L. Ruv. 193, 243 (1977) (general agreement that waiver of a right is
ineffective if induced by defendant's perception that failure to waive would result
in improper official action to his detriment).
143 Stanley Sporkin, former Director of the SEC's Enforcement Division, has
denied that the Commission uses its administrative powers to coerce corporations
into revealing privileged documents; rather, he feels, corporations generally divulge
privileged information to the SEC because it is in their interest to have the SEC
(but no one else) see it. Interview with Stanley Sporkin (Mar. 18, 1982).
144 See K. DAvIs, 2 TREATnsE oN ADINnIsTRATvE LAw § 8.3, at 163-67
(1979).
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disclosure to the SEC or to any administrative agency cannot be
considered involuntary, at least in the absence of proven specific
instances of coercion.
In sum, the case for limited waiver appears neither stronger
nor weaker for the SEC than for any other federal agency. If a
theory of limited waiver is to be accepted, then, it cannot be con-
fined to the SEC situation. The case law, however, seems to have
centered on instances of cooperation with the SEC.145 This Com-
ment will therefore focus on the theory of limited waiver of the
attorney-client privilege in an SEC investigation, with the under-
standing that the result and the reasoning are generally applicable
to other federal administrative agencies through the theory of selec-
tive administrative limited waiver.
B. The Arguments for and Against Limited Waiver
The justification for limited waiver rests primarily on the de-
sirability of encouraging production of privileged documents to the
SEC. The SEC's function is to ensure that the investing public is
provided with truthful and complete data on the financial condi-
tion of their investments, and the Commission's task may become
more difficult without access to privileged documents. Because the
SEC is a public agency, its efficiency is a matter of public concern.
It is thus in the public interest to encourage production of privi-
leged documents to the SEC.
Limited waiver might encourage such disclosures if a corpora-
tion has not committed any acts that fall within the SEC's juris-
diction, but has secrets that might be of interest to another regula-
tory agency 140 or to a private party. 47 In such a situation, limited
waiver removes the disincentive for complying with an SEC sub-
poena, and may spur a corporation to surrender the subpoenaed
documents to end the SEC investigation. 48
Limited waiver might also produce a less direct benefit by en-
couraging corporations to conduct internal investigations. Limited
14 5 This may be true because the SEC seeks information on a broad range of
topics, but uses that information only for the limited purpose of verifying the
accuracy of financial statements and required disclosures.
146 E.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
147 E.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
bane).
148 Even if the corporation has nothing to hide from the SEC in the instant
investigation, it still might refuse to surrender privileged material to avoid setting
a bad precedent: not surrendering privileged material in a subsequent investigation
might arouse the SEC's suspicion.
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waiver would be most likely to have this effect when the SEC asks
a corporation to conduct an investigation in order to spare the SEC
staff time and effort. Corporate managers are unlikely to agree to
unearth instances of corporate misconduct for the SEC if they know
that others will have access to the information.149 Their refusal to
investigate will, in turn, increase the regulatory burden on the SEC
and possibly result in fewer investigations being conducted. The
availability of limited waiver may not, however, have any effect on
corporate managers' decisions to undertake internal investigations
for other reasons. Managers and directors might, for example,
launch an investigation in order to fulfill their fiduciary obligations
to shareholders or to forestall an SEC investigation. 150 In this situa-
tion, the corporation can preserve the confidentiality of its docu-
ments by simply invoking the attorney-client privilege in response
to an agency subpoena.
The last argument in favor of limited waiver relates to the
nature of the privilege itself. The attorney-client privilege pre-
vents disclosure of communications but does not protect the secrecy
of the underlying facts.' 51 An adversary is not foreclosed from de-
posing witnesses and asking the same questions that the client's
attorney has asked, or from issuing subpoenas for the same internal
memoranda that the attorney has inspected. Limited waiver, then,
would make the adversary's task decidedly more difficult, but would
not constitute an absolute bar to discovery of the privileged in-
formation.
Against these arguments, however, must be weighed the cost
that limited waiver imposes on the evidentiary process. Privileges
in general are an exception to the normal rules of evidence because
the judicial system, through the rules of discovery, requires each
party to submit all evidence that is relevant to the resolution of a
dispute. The judicial system tolerates certain privileges because it
is supposed that the system will benefit from encouraging the con-
fidentiality of privileged relationships more than it will suffer from
the withdrawal of the privileged information from the factfinding
process. 15 2 The benefits of the privilege, however, are unproven,
particularly as they apply to corporations.153 Limited waiver, by
149 Cf. Note, supra note 24, at 1178.
15 0 See Block & Barton, supra note 77, at 7-8.
1 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. But see infra note 158 and
accompanying text.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
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diluting the confidentiality requirement, increases the availability
of the privilege to the very clients who are least likely to need it.
The ultimate purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to im-
prove the attorney-client relationship, thereby furthering the ad-
ministration of justice. The purpose of limited waiver, on the
other hand, is the facilitation of the administrative function of the
SEC or other government agencies.154 Although such a goal may
be socially worthwhile, the judicial system does not tailor its results
to achieve social benefits in every imaginable situation. 55
The argument that facilitation of the SEC's functions is a judi-
cially recognizable priority can be answered in a number of ways.
First, the SEC already possesses a broad range of investigative powers
and sanctions,'5 6 and may not have much need for additional pro-
cedural tools for acquiring information. Second, there are many
alternative ways to increase the SEC's ability to acquire information,
one of which would be for Congress to declare the attorney-client
privilege inapplicable in all SEC proceedings. 57 Third, by grant-
ing the SEC certain investigatory powers, Congress implicitly ex-
pressed a desire to allow the agency to reach a certain amount of
evidence and no more. It may not be the courts' function to in-
crease these implied limits on the agency's ability to procure infor-
mation. And fourth, even if the corporation asserts its privilege
the SEC may unearth the underlying facts on its own by deposing
154 See supra text following note 145.
155 See Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221 ("[We cannot see how the availability of
a limited waiver' would serve the interests underlying the common law privilege
for confidential communications between attorney and client ... Voluntary co-
operation with government investigations may be a laudable activity, but it is
hard to understand how such conduct improves the attorney-client relationship.").
156 See Rowe, supra note 141, at 19-20.
157As already mentioned, the attorney-client privilege does not have a con-
stitutional dimension in civil cases, and could be withdrawn entirely at Congress'
whim. See supra note 37. Limited waiver might be appropriate if promulgated
by the legislative branch, however, because
Congress is more sensitively tuned to the competing social interests that
demand accommodation and because the institutional legitimacy of a leg-
islative act depends not so much on the rational persuasiveness of its de-
cisions as on the simple fact that a majority of "responsible" elected
officials were willing to vote for the proposition.
Burt, Miranda and Title Il-A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 S. Cr. REv. 81, 114.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that "the Court should often defer to
the ability of Congress to effectuate a more precise compromise of competing in-
terests." Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HA1v. L. REv. 1532, 1549 (1972) (footnote omitted). Congress already pre-
scribes rules of evidence for the federal judiciary, and could adopt a doctrine of
limited waiver if it so desired.
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the same witnesses that the attorney had questioned and subpoena-
ing the same documents that the attorney had used.
158
A second argument against limited waiver is a variation of the
fairness argument that courts have accepted in the form of the "sub-
ject matter" waiver rule.159 Just as selectivity about which parts of
a privileged communication to reveal is an impermissible "offensive"
use of the privilege, so is selectivity about which parties to reveal
the communication to. Both kinds of selective disclosure are at-
tempts to gain tactical advantages from a privilege "intended only
as an incidental means of defense." 160 The Permian court's con-
struction of the fairness argument declared:
[C]ourts have been vigilant to prevent litigants from con-
verting the privilege into a tool for selective disclosure.
. . . The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose
among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and
resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others,
or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose
confidentiality has already been compromised for his own
benefit .... The attorney-client privilege is not designed
for such tactical employment.""'
The Permian court thus viewed confidentiality as the "traditional
price" 102 of the attorney-client privilege.
In the usual limited waiver situation, the client is not con-
cerned with the absolute confidentiality of the communications.0 3
Rather, the client corporation wishes to prevent others from using
the information contained in the privileged documents against the
corporation. This is not necessarily true of other attorney-client
situations, where confidentiality may be important to the client.
15 8 See supra text accompanying notes 32-33. "Litigants may still examine
business documents, depose corporate employees and interview nonemployees,
[and] obtain preexisting documents and financial records..... .Diversified, 572
F.2d at 611. The Diversified court used this argument in favor of limited waiver,
but it seems to provide strong reasons against that doctrine. Other litigants are
less likely than regulatory agencies to have the resources necessary to dig through
all the possible sources for the relevant information. Limited waiver, then,
would add to the information-seeking capability of those who need it least-fed-
eral agencies.
159 See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
160 8 J. WiGmoBE, supra note 1, § 2327, at 638. But see Note, supra note 63,
at 981 ("Because the limited waiver situation involves a full disclosure, there is
no attempt to use the privilege offensively.").
161 665 F.2d at 1221 (citations omitted).
162 Id. 1222.
163 If the client were concerned with absolute confidentiality, the privileged
documents would not be surrendered to the SEC in any case.
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For example, in many instances outside knowledge of the content
of privileged communications might be as damaging as having the
privileged communications introduced into evidence, because that
knowledge would lead to other evidence that could be used against
the client.164 The requirement of confidentiality, then, cuts strongly
against any doctrine of selective or limited waiver, because the
justification for the privilege is to encourage disclosure to the
attorney of information that would otherwise be kept secret. 1 5
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the goals of encouraging internal corporate investi-
gations and voluntary cooperation with government agencies are
laudable, the limited waiver doctrine is not an appropriate means
of promoting them. Limited waiver represents an expansion of an
evidentiary privilege that imposes obvious costs on the judicial sys-
tem and offers only speculative benefits. Just as there is no proof
that the attorney-client privilege induces clients to divulge con-
fidences to their attorneys, there is little reason to believe that
limited waiver of the privilege would increase the sum total of
corporate investigations. While it seems more likely that limited
waiver would encourage cooperation with government agencies, this
possible benefit does not outweigh the doctrine's costs. Because
the SEC has no greater claim to judicial solicitude than other
government agencies, limited waiver cannot be confined to disclo-
sures to the SEC. Thus, under limited waiver, the disclosure of
privileged communications to any agency would not result in a
waiver of the privilege as against third parties. The judicial system
would be deprived of potentially vast quantities of relevant infor-
mation as to which the privilege would otherwise be deemed waived.
Moreover, the goal of furthering cooperation with government
agencies is unrelated to the goal underlying the privilege itself-
that of furthering legal consultation.
The modern approach to the rules of evidence strongly favors
the admission into evidence of all relevant information. The at-
torney-client privilege, like all exclusionary rules of evidence, should
be narrowly construed: any voluntary breach of confidentiality
164It has been recognized, for example, that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination "not only extends to answers that would in themselves
support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those
which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
claimant." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (citation
omitted).
115 See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
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should constitute a waiver. A corporation should not be allowed
to waive selectively the attorney-client privilege when waiver suits
its purposes and to retain the privilege when it does not. The
corporation should instead be required to decide whether it wishes
to surrender privileged documents and waive the privilege, or re-
tain the privilege and forego the benefit that it might have derived
from selective disclosure. The doctrine of limited waiver should
be rejected by the federal courts.
